Abstract-Password security can no longer provide enough security in the area of remote user authentication. Considering this security drawback, researchers are trying to find solution with multifactor remote user authentication system. Recently, three factor remote user authentication using biometric and smart card has drawn a considerable attention of the researchers. However, most of the current proposed schemes have security flaws. They are vulnerable to attacks like user impersonation attack, server masquerading attack, password guessing attack, insider attack, denial of service attack, forgery attack, etc. Also, most of them are unable to provide mutual authentication, session key agreement and password, or smart card recovery system. Considering these drawbacks, we propose a secure three factor user authentication scheme using biometric and smart card. Through security analysis, we show that our proposed scheme can overcome drawbacks of existing systems and ensure high security in remote user authentication.
are also vulnerable to one or more of the above mentioned attacks. Additionally, most of them are unable to provide mutual authentication, session key agreement and password, or smart card recovery system.
In this paper, we propose a three factor user authentication scheme using biometric and smart card that can resist all the above mentioned attacks and is able to provide mutual authentication, session key agreement and password, or smart card recovery system. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section Ⅱ discusses related works, Section Ⅲ describes Li et al. [16] scheme briefly and Section Ⅳ discusses the security flaws of their scheme. Then, proposed scheme and its security analysis are presented in Section V and Section VI respectively. Finally, we draw our conclusion in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
A highly secure system requires secure authentication system to deal with high level of security risk. To ensure that type of security, multi-factor user authentication system comes into account. Nowadays, the biometric and smart card based user authentication schemes along with password have drawn a considerable amount of attention from the researchers [11] - [16] .
In 2010, an efficient biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart card [11] was proposed by Hwang et al. They claimed that the computation cost of their work was relatively low compared with other related schemes. Their proposed scheme is based on smart card, one way hash function and biometric verification. Their scheme can resist masquerading attack, replay attack, parallel session attack and can provide the security of the information stored within the smart card. Moreover, it enables the user to change their password freely, provides mutual authentication between the remote server and the user, doesn't need to store any password or identity tables, doesn't require any synchronized clock and provides non-repudiation.
Das presented an analysis and improvement on an efficient biometric based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in [14] . He claimed that the scheme proposed by Hwang et al. [11] has design flaws in login and authentication phase, password change phase, and verification of biometrics using hash function. He provided an improved scheme to fix these flaws. In this scheme, the user can freely change password by providing both old and new passwords. He also provided a security analysis to show that their scheme can fix the security flaws of [11] .
In [15] , An revealed the security flaws of the scheme proposed by Das [14] . He showed that the scheme presented in [14] is vulnerable to user impersonation attack, server masquerading attack, password guessing attack, and insider attack and it cannot provide mutual authentication. He proposed security analysis and enhancements of an effective biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards to overcome these security weaknesses of [14] , while preserving all its merits. He claimed that his scheme can prevent user impersonation attack, server masquerading attack, password guessing attack, insider attack and can provide mutual authentication.
In 2013, Li et al. conducted a detail analysis on [15] and revealed some weaknesses such as vulnerability to denial of service attack, and forgery attack and inability to provide session key agreement [16] ; they proposed a robust biometric based remote user authentication scheme with session key agreement using elliptical curve cryptography [16] to overcome these weaknesses. They also provided a security analysis to show that their scheme can overcome the security flaws of the scheme proposed in [15] . They claimed that their scheme can provide the security of secret key, session key agreement, proper biometric authentication, quick detection of unauthorized login, proper mutual authentication, prevent forgery attack, stolen smart card attack, and replay attack. In the following section, we briefly discuss the scheme presented by Li et al.
III. REVIEW OF LI ET AL.'S SCHEME
The scheme uses a fuzzy extractor which is a pair of procedure ( , ) such that:
is reasonably close to . Initially, chooses an elliptic curve equation ( , ) over a prime finite field and a base point with order over ( , ) and publishes parameters ( ( , ), , ). It also chooses a master secret key and distributes it to the server through a secure channel. There are four phases in this scheme: the registration phase, the login phase, the authentication and key agreement phase, and the password change phase.
A. Registration Phase
During this phase, the registration center and the user have to perform the following steps:
1) Registration Request
The user provides his , , at the fuzzy extractor and a random number . The sends , , to the registration center via a secure channel.
2) Data Processing
The computes , , , and using (5), (4), (6) and (1) respectively.
3) Card Preparation
The stores ( , , , , ℎ(. )) on the 's smart card and sends it to the via a secure channel.
4) Finalization
The enters into the smart card.
B. Login Phase
During this phase, the user performs the following steps:
1) Biometric Verification
The inserts the smart card into a card reader and also provides , , to a specific device with fuzzy extractor and generates using (2) . Then, the smart card computes by placing provided and calculated at (4). If = , then the user passes biometric verification and continues the following steps. Otherwise, the session is terminated.
2) Password Verification
The smart card computes and using (3) and by placing provided and calculated at (6) respectively. It checks whether = or not. If they are equal, then and are verified and smart card performs the next step. Otherwise, the session is terminated.
3) Login Request
The smart card computes 1 , 2 and 3 using (7), (8) and (9) respectively.
2 = where * (8)
The sends a login request { , 2 , 3 } to the server .
C. Authentication and Session Key Agreement Phase
During this phase, the user and the server perform the following steps:
1) User ID Validation
The checks the format of .
2) Login Request Verification
If is valid, then the computes 4 and 3 using following equations:
It checks whether 3 = 3 or not. If they are equal, the accepts login request message and validity of the user is authenticated by the server . Otherwise, the session is terminated.
3) Mutual Authentication Request
The server computes 5 and 6 using (12) and (13) respectively.
=
where * (12)
It sends a mutual authentication message { 5 , 6 } to the user .
4) Mutual Authentication Process
After receiving reply, the user checks whether 6 = 6 or not. The 6 is calculated as follow:
If they are equal, then the server is authenticated by the user and mutual authentication is completed.
5) Session Key Generation
The user and the server compute a shared key using (15).
It is used for future confidential communication.
D. Password Change Phase
1) Biometric Verification
The inserts his smart card into a card reader and also provides , , to a specific device with fuzzy extractor and generates using (2) . Then, smart card computes by placing provided and calculated at (4) and compares it with which is stored into the smart card. If = , then the user passes biometric verification and continues the following steps.
2) Password Verification
The smart card computes and using (3) and by placing provided and calculated at (6) respectively and checks whether = or not. If they are equal, then and are verified and smart card performs the next step. The user inputs his new password .
3) Data Procession for New Password
The smart card computes and using (3) and (6) respectively and by replacing by and by . The is calculated as follow:
4) Finalization
The smart card replaces and by and respectively to complete the phase.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE LI ET AL.'S SCHEME In this section, we discuss security weaknesses of the scheme proposed by Li et al. [16] . We assume that the attacker Ai can control the insecure channel.
A. Password Guessing Attack Using Stolen Smart Card
If can manage to steal the smart card, then he can extract information from the card by examining the power consumption signal [17] - [18] . He also can manage by capturing one of the login request messages or simply using shoulder surfing technique. When the attacker manages to achieve information like , , , ℎ(. ), he can conduct password guessing attack.
Consider that the selects a password from a massive database of passwords. Then, he computes and using (3) and (6) respectively and by replacing with and with . He checks whether = or not. If they are equal, the selected password is correct. Otherwise, he repeats the process again.
B. User impersonation Attack
User impersonation attack can be launched after password guessing attack using stolen smart card. From previous discussion, we know that the attacker has ( , , , , ℎ(. ), ) from smart card and as well as password from password guessing attack. Moreover, the parameters ( ( , ), , ) which are published by the registration center , are stored in the smart card or published in a public domain. So, he can manage to gather these parameters, perform the following steps and try to login to the remote server .
1) Login Request by
The computes using (3) and by replacing with . It also calculates 1 , 2 and 3 using (7), (8) and (9) respectively and by replacing with . It sends { , 2 , 3 } to the server .
2) User ID Validation by
The receives message sent by the and verifies .
3) Login Request Verification by
If is valid, then the computes 4 and 3 from (10) and (11) respectively. It checks whether 3 = 3 or not. If they are equal, the server authenticates the as valid user.
4) Mutual Authentication Request by
The server computes 5 and 6 using (12) and (13) respectively and sends a mutual authentication message { 5 , 6 } to the attacker .
5) Mutual Authentication Process by
After receiving reply, the attacker calculates 6 using (14) and checks whether 6 = 6 or not. If they are equal, then the server is authenticated by the attacker and the mutual authentication is completed.
6) Session Key Generation by and
The attacker and the server compute shared key using (15) and use it for future confidential communication.
C. Security of the Secret Key
The secret key remains stored in the server. Generally, the server stores this type of information in a database or in a file. Because of being unique for every user, the server has to maintain a mapping of and . According to the discussion in [6] , information stored in the server database could be compromised. Therefore, this scheme is unable to provide the security of secret key.
D. Server Masquerading Attack
If the attacker can manage to steal the secret key as discussed in previous section, then it can launch attack as follow:
1) Login Request by
The computes , 1 , 2 and 3 using (3), (7), (8) and (9) and sends { , 2 , 3 } to the (because the is masquerading as server).
2) Login Request Verification by
The receives message sent by the and computes 4 and 3 using (10) and (11) respectively and checks whether 3 = 3 or not. If they are equal, then the authenticates the as valid user.
3) Mutual Authentication Request by
The computes 5 and 6 using (12) and (13) respectively and sends a mutual authentication message { 5 , 6 } to the user .
4) Mutual Authentication Process by
After receiving reply, the user calculates 6 using (14) and checks whether 6 = 6 or not. If they are equal, then the (because the believes the as server) is authenticated by the user and the mutual authentication is completed.
5) Session Key Generation by and
The user C and attacker compute a shared key using (15) and use it for future confidential communication.
E. Password or Smart Card Recovery
There is no password or smart card recovery phase in this scheme. According to the discussion of [5] , the user can forget his password. If he forgets his password, there is no way he ever can get logged in. Moreover, if the attacker somehow can manage to steal the smart card of the user , then the will not be able to recover the smart card.
F. Mutual Authentication
According to [15] , if authentication scheme is insecure against user impersonation attack and server masquerading attack, then the authentication schemes cannot provide mutual authentication between the user and the remote server. Therefore, this scheme fails to provide mutual authentication according to the discussion in subsection IV(B) and IV(D).
V. PROPOSED SCHEME In this section, we first discuss some preliminary knowledge and then, we present our scheme.
A. Background 1) Accessing Smart Card
An attacker can access information of a smart card by using power analysis attack [17] - [18] . There are two types of power analysis attack: Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. In SPA attack, the attacker visually inspects the system's power consumption. The DPA attack is more powerful than the SPA attack because the attacker does not need to know as many details about how the algorithm was implemented.
2) Biometric Key Generation
Biometric cryptosystem and cancelable biometrics represent emerging technologies to release biometric keys as well as provide privacy to biometric templates [19] . Dodis et al. claimed that strong biometric keys can be generated from biometric templates using fuzzy extractor [20] . An efficient cancelable biometric key generation scheme for cryptographic use that can generate 256 bit keys from fingerprint templates is proposed in [21] and an efficient approach for noninvertible cryptographic key generation from cancelable fingerprint biometrics is proposed at [22] . Jagadeesan et al. [23] proposed a cryptographic key generation scheme from multiple biometric modalities that can generate 256 bit key. One of these efficient key generation methods can be used in our proposed scheme.
3) Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function is a mathematical algorithm that maps data of arbitrary size to a bit string of a fixed size (a hash function) which is designed to be one-way function, that is, a function which is infeasible to invert [24] . The example of hash functions are MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2 family, SHA-3 family, etc. The MD5 and SHA-1 are no longer recommended due to security reason. Either SHA-2 family or SHA-3 family should be used to generate message digest.
4) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
AES is a symmetric key algorithm where a single key named private key is used for both encryption and decryption purpose [25] . It is also known as Rijndael. It is based on a design principle known as substitution-permutation network. It is a block cipher with three different key lengths: 128, 192 and 256 bits. The degree of security relies on the key length.
Despite the different key length AES operate on 128 bits plain text block and generates 128 bits cipher text. The performance of AES is very convincing. It is a high speed algorithm and also requires low RAM. Therefore, it can be implemented from 8 bit smart card to high performance computer.
B. Our Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme consists of six phases that includes server registration phase, user registration phase, login and authentication phase, password change phase, password recovery phase, and smart card recovery phase. Also, we have few assumptions under which our proposed scheme worked properly. They are given bellow:
• User or server id is unique but not a secret.
• Password is secret but it may not be unique.
• Biometric key is unique and very hard to be copied, shared and distributed.
• AES keys are secret and the attacker cannot steal them.
• Smart card can be stolen and information stored in smart card can be revealed.
• The attacker cannot manage to steal smart card, password and biometric key at the same time.
• The attacker cannot take over secure channel.
• The attacker has control over insecure channel.
C. Server Registration Phase
During the server registration phase, the server and the registration center will perform the following steps:
1) Registration Request by
The server sets = and sends { , } to the registration center .
2) Secret Generation and Reply by
The receives { , } from the . If = , then it checks into its database. If the server is already registered, then it discards the process. Otherwise, it chooses a secret random string 1 and generates using (17) . 
It sets = and sends { , , } to the through a secure channel.
3) Secret Storage and Acknowledgement by
The receives { , , } from the and checks . If matches with its own and = , then it calculates using (18).
It stores into its database. It sets = and sends { , } to the .
4) Finalization by
After receiving acknowledgement { , } from the , the calculates as follow:
It stores { , } into its database. The server registration phase is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
D. User Registration Phase
During user registration phase, the user , the registration center , and the server will perform the following steps:
1) Registration Request by
The user needs to choose his user identification , password , recovery contact , collect server identification which is published publicly, and imprint his biometrics in a specific device which can generate biometric key form biometrics. He also calculates as follow:
Then, he sets = and sends { , , , , } to the registration center through a secure channel.
2) Registration Request by
The registration center receives message { , , , , } from the . If = and is already registered, then it generates a secret random string and calculates using (21).
The R sends { , , , } to the server through a secure channel.
3) Secret Generation, Storage and Reply by
The server receives { , , , } from the . It verifies
. If the verification passes, then it proceeds; otherwise, it discards the request. If the verification passes and = , then it calculates , and using (22) , (23) and (24) respectively.
Then, it stores { , } into its database, sets = and sends { , , } to the registration center through a secure channel.
4) Card Preparation and Delivery by
The R receives { , , } from the . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it confirms that the registration process in the server has completed. Then, it calculates and using (25) and (26) respectively.
It stores { , , , } into a smart card and distributes it to the through a secure channel.
5) Card Receive and Acknowledgement by
The receives the smart card from the . Then, he puts the smart card into a card reader and checks and . If they are correct, then he provides and imprints his biometrics to the specific device to generate biometric key . Then, he calculates by putting and at (20) and compares whether = or not. If the verification passes, then he accepts the card, sets = and sends { , , } to the through a secure channel.
He calculates using (27) and replaces in the smart card. He also removes from the card. If the verification fails, he rejects the card, sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the and discards process.
6) Data Storage and Finalization by
The receives { , , } from the . It verifies and . If verification passes, then it checks . If = , then it confirms that the card has reached to its designated user. Then, it calculates , and as follow: 
It stores { , , , , } into its database. If = or if the verification fails, then it discards the process and sets = and sends the a message { , , } through a secure channel to deregister the user. When receives such message, then it deletes the corresponding data from its database. The user registration phase is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
E. Login and Authentication Phase
During this phase, the user and the server will perform the following steps:
1) Login Request by
The user inserts his smart card into the card reader. He also provides his , and imprints his biometrics to a specific device to generate biometric key . Then, the user verifies . If the verification fails, then he terminates the session. After that, he calculates , and using (10), (31) and (32) respectively.
He generates a secret random string 2 and calculates 1 and 2 using (33) and (34) respectively. Then, he sets = and sends { , , 1 , 2 , } to the server .
2) Verification and Mutual Authentication Request by
The server receives login message { , , 1 , 2 , } from the user . It verifies of the message with stored and with its server id. If the verification fails, then it terminates the session. If the verification passes and = , then it proceeds. It calculates and 2 using (35) and (36) respectively and 3 by placing calculated and 2 at (33).
Then, it compares whether 1 = 3 or not. If they are not equal, it terminates the session. Otherwise, the user is authenticated. It generates a secret random string 3 . It calculates 4 by replacing 2 with 3 at (33) and 5 using (37). Then, it sets = ℎ and sends { , , 4 , 5 , } to the user .
3) Mutual Authentication and Acknowledgement by
The user receives message { , , 4 , 5 , } from the . He verifies and of the message. If the verification fails, then he terminates the session. If the verification passes and = ℎ, then he proceeds. He calculates 3 using (38) and 6 by putting and calculated 3 at (33).
He compares whether 4 = 6 or not. If they are not equal, then he terminates the session. Otherwise, the server is authenticated. The user calculates 7 using (39) and sets = ℎ and sends { , , 7 , } to the server . If the session is terminated, he sends login request again.
4) Verification and Finalization by
The server S i receives { , , 7 , } from the . Then, it checks and . If is desired user id, is desired server id and = ℎ, then it calculates 8 by putting , 2 and 3 at (39). It compares whether 7 = 8 or not. If they are not equal, it discards the message and terminates the session. Otherwise, the authentication is completed.
5) Session Key Generation by and
The and the both calculate the session key for further secret communication. The session key is calculated as follow:
The login and authentication phase is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
F. Password Change Phase
During password change phase, the user , the registration center , and the server will perform the following steps:
1) Password Change Request by
The user inserts his smart card into the card reader. He also provides his , and imprints his biometrics into a specific device to generate biometric key . Then, the user verifies
. If the verification fails, he discards the process. Otherwise, he calculates , , and using (20) , (31), (32) and (41) respectively. (24) respectively. It replaces with in its database. Then, it sets = and sends { , , } to the through a secure channel. If the process is discarded, then it sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the . If the receives this failure message, then it sends secret change request again.
4) Smart Card Update Request by
The R receives { , , } from the . (29) respectively. It also replaces with and with into its own database. Otherwise, if the verification fails, then it discards the process. The sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the and the to revert their changes and they act accordingly. The password change phase is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
G. Password Recovery Phase
If the user forgets his password, then , the registration center , and the server will have to perform the following steps:
1) Password Recovery Request by
The user needs to provide his user identification and collect server identification which is published publicly. Then he sets = and sends message { , , } to the through a secure channel.
2) User Verification Request by
The receives message { , , } from the user . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it proceeds. Otherwise, if verification process fails, then it terminates the process. It generates a secret random string 5 and calculates as follow:
It sets = and sends a message { , , 5 , } to the recovery contact ( ) of the through a secure channel.
3) Verification Reply by
The user receives message { , , 5 , } from the . Then he checks and . If they are correct and = , then he proceeds. He sets = , chooses a new password , calculates by replacing with at (20) and sends { , , 5 , , } to the through a secure channel. Otherwise, if verification fails, then he simply discards the message and sends recovery request again.
4) Finalization of Verification and Secret Change Request by Registration Center
The receives message { , , 5 6 and respectively at (21) . Then, it sets = and sends { , , , , } to the server through a secure channel.
5) Secret Change and Reply by
The server receives { , , , , } from the . It verifies and . If verification passes, then it proceeds; otherwise, it discards the request. It calculates and using (22) and (35) respectively, and by putting calculated and at (23) , and compares whether = or not. If they are not equal, then it discards the request. If they match, then it calculates and by replacing with and with at (23) and (24) respectively and replaces with in its database. Then, it sets = and sends { , , } to the through a secure channel. If the process is discarded, then it sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the . If the receives the failure message, then it sends secret change request again.
6) Smart Card Update Request by
The receives { , , } from the . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it assumes that the update process in the server has completed. Otherwise, if verification fails, then it discards the process. When it has the confirmation of the completion of the server update, then it calculates by replacing with 6 at (26), and using (42). It sets = and sends { , , , , } to the user through a secure channel. If the process is discarded, it sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the . If the receives this failure message, then it simply reverts database changes. The sends secret change request to the again.
7) Smart Card Update and Acknowledgement by
The user receives message { , , , , } from the . Then he checks and . If they are correct and = , then he calculates using (31) and compares whether = or not. If verification passes, then he sets = and sends { , , } to the through a secure channel. Then, he calculates by replacing with at (27) and replaces with in the smart card. If any of the verifications fails, then he rejects the reply. If the reply is rejected, he discards the process, sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the and retries password recovery again. If the receives this failure message, then it sends a failure message to the to revert database changes and the does accordingly.
8) Database Update and Finalization by
The receives { , , } from the user . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it confirms that the card has updated and it calculates and by replacing with and with at (30) and (29) respectively. It also replaces with and with into its own database. Otherwise, if verification fails, then it discards the process. The sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the and the to revert their changes and they act accordingly. The Password recovery phase is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
H. Smart Card Recovery Phase
If the user loses his smart card, then he, the registration center and the server will have to perform the following steps:
1) Smart Card Recovery Request by
The user needs to provide his user identification and collect server identification which is published publicly. Then, he sets = and sends message { , , } to the through a secure channel.
2) User Verification Request by
The receives message { , , } from the user . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it proceeds. Otherwise, if verification process fails, then it terminates the process. It generates a secret random string 7 
3) Verification Reply by
The user receives message { , , 7 , } from the . Then, he checks and . If they are correct and = , then he proceeds. He sets = , chooses a new password , calculates by replacing with at (20) and sends { , , 7 , , } to the through a secure channel. Otherwise, if verification fails, then he simply discards the message and sends recovery request again.
4) Finalization of Verification and Secret Change Request by Registration Center
The receives message { , , 7 , , } from the user . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it verifies 7 . If it holds, then it confirms that the user is valid. Otherwise, if any of the verifications fails, it discards the message. If the user is valid, then it chooses a secret random string 8 , calculates using (43) and by replacing and with 8 and respectively at (21) . Then, it sets = and sends { , , , , } to the server through a secure channel.
5) Secret Change and Reply by
The server receives { , , , , } from the . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it proceeds; otherwise, it discards the request. It calculates and using (22) and (35) respectively, and by putting calculated and at (23) , and compares whether = or not. If they are not equal, then it discards the request. If they match, then it calculates and by replacing with and with at (23) and (24) respectively, and replaces with into its database. Then, it sets = and sends { , , } to the through a secure channel. If the process is discarded, then it sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the . If the receives this failure message, then it sends secret change request again.
6) Smart Card Preparation and Delivery by
The receives { , , } from the and verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it assumes that the update process in the server has completed. Otherwise, if verification fails, then it discards the process. When it has the confirmation of the completion of the server update, it calculates by replacing with 8 at (26) and using (42). It stores { , , , } into a smart card and distributes it to the user through a secure channel. If the process is discarded, it sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the . When the receives this failure message, it simply reverts database changes. The sends secret change request to the again.
7) Smart Card Receive and Acknowledgement by
The receives smart card from the . Then, the puts his smart card into a card reader. Then, he checks and . If they are correct, then the provides and imprints his biometrics to the specific device to generate biometric key . Then, he calculates by replacing with at (20) and compares whether = or not. If verification passes, then he accepts the card, sets = and sends { , , } to the through a secure channel. Then, he calculates by replacing with at (27), and replaces with in the smart card. He also removes from the card. If verification fails, he discards the process, sets = , sends a failure message { , , } to the trough a secure channel and sends recovery request again. If the receives this failure message, then it sends a failure message to the to revert database changes and the does it accordingly.
8) Database Update and Finalization by
The receives { , , } from the user . It verifies and . If verification passes and = , then it confirms that the card has reached to its designated user and it calculates and by replacing with and with at (30) and (29) respectively. It also replaces with and with into its own database. Otherwise, if verification fails, then it discards the process. The sets = and sends a failure message { , , } to the and the to revert their changes and they act accordingly. The Smart card recovery phase is illustrated in Fig. 6 .
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we will show how our scheme can resist security attacks and prevent the attacker to cause any potential harm.
A. Password Guessing Attack
If the attacker can manage to steal the smart card, then he can manage to extract information from the card by examining the power consumption signal [17] - [18] . He can collect information like from it. The is an encrypted information and contains within it. Moreover, we can clearly see from (26) that holds no information about password. Also, he can manage to get messages like { ,
7 , } and { , , } from login and authentication phase by eavesdropping the insecure channel. The 1 , 2 , 5 and 7 are calculated using (33), (34), (37) and (39) respectively. The 4 is calculated by replacing 2 with 3 at (33). But, none of these messages contain password directly. So, there is no way the attacker can conduct password guessing attack by trial and error basis.
B. Secret Key Stealing
The master secret key is not stored in the smart card. To generate , the attacker needs to decrypt to get and also needs biometric key and password . From section A, we can say that the attacker cannot manage to get password . At the same time biometric key is very hard to copy. Therefore, the attacker cannot generate from smart card.
At the trusted registration center, we store , and . From (29), (30) and (19) , we can see all these data are encrypted. Unless the attacker can manage to get , it is almost impossible for him to get , and . Without these, he cannot generate master secret key .
At the server, we store and . From (24) and (18), we can see that all these data are encrypted. Unless the attacker can manage to get , it is almost impossible for him to get . Because and both are AES keys and kept secret by the trusted registration center and the server respectively, we assume that the attacker won't be able to get them. Therefore, the attacker cannot get from the trusted registration center and the server.
The attacker can gather login messages like 1 , 2 , 4 , 5 and 7 by forging into the insecure channel which is used during login and authentication phase. Here, 2 and 3 are two secret random strings generated during login, and authentication phase and they change every time during message generation. Therefore, there is no way to collect these strings. This is why, it is nearly impossible for an attacker to guess from these messages.
C. User Impersonation Attack
To conduct user impersonation attack, the attacker needs to send login request { , , 1 , 2 , }. More precisely, he needs to generate 1 and 2 using (33) and (34) respectively. From previous discussion at subsection VI(B), we know that the attacker cannot manage and 2 . So, it is not possible for him to generate 1 and 2 . Therefore, he cannot impersonate as user.
D. Server Masquerading Attack
To conduct server masquerading attack, the attacker need to send mutual authentication request { , , 4 , 5 , }. More precisely, he needs to generate 4 and 5 using (33) and (37) respectively. From previous discussion at subsection VI(B), we already know that the attacker cannot manage , 2 and 3 . So, it is not possible for him to generate 4 and 5 . Therefore, he cannot masquerade as server.
E. Replay Attack
In 7 . If he sends a captured 7 to the server , it will fail the verification because the will calculate 8 with recently generated 3 and it will not match with previously generated 3 which was used to calculate 7 . Therefore, the will discard the message and terminate the session.
F. Mutual Authentication
According to [15] , if a scheme is insecure against impersonation attack and server masquerading attack, then it cannot provide mutual authentication. However, we have shown that our scheme can provide security against impersonation attack at subsection VI(C) and server masquerading attack at subsection VI(D). Therefore, we can say our scheme provides mutual authentication.
G. Password and Smart Card Recovery
Our scheme also consists of very good and secure password and smart card recovery options. A user needs to provide a correct and trusted recovery contact during registration and follow the password or smart card recovery steps.
H. Prevents Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
If any scheme uses biometric templates directly, then there exists a possibility that sometimes it may fail to match the provided templates with stored templates. It is due to existence of noise or different orientation of imprinting the biometrics, etc. However, our scheme does not use templates directly. We use algorithms which rely on biometric cryptosystem or cancellable biometrics technology and can release unique biometric key from the templates which are relatively close enough. This is how our scheme prevents denial of service (DoS) attack.
I. Forgery Attack
In this attack, the attacker may forge into the insecure channel and manage to get messages which are used during login and authentication phase. But, he cannot use these messages to gather any information to generate future login and authentication messages. We have already shown that how the scheme prevents user impersonation attack and server masquerading attack. The attacker may also try to use old messages to gain access. We have shown that how our scheme can resist replay attack. So, considering all these analysis we can say our scheme can resist forgery attack.
J. Session Key Support
The session key is required to conduct further secret communication between the user and the server after login. Our scheme provides a mechanism to generate session key during the authentication phase. It reduces the overhead of computation and communication, and also provides the opportunity to conduct further secret communication smoothly.
K. Comparison with Existing Schemes
Comparisons among our scheme and few of the existing schemes in terms of security features and functionality are summarized in Table 2 .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a secure three factor user authentication scheme using biometric and smart card. Through security analysis, we have shown that our scheme outperforms existing schemes in terms of security and features. Our proposed scheme uses the strength of AES to prevent the attacker from stealing data as well as resists several attacks to ensure the security of the login and authentication mechanism. Moreover, it provides password, and smart card recovery options. Our scheme also supports session key agreement to ensure the further secret communication, reduces the overhead of computation and communication. It also uses secure key generation process to generate biometric keys from biometrics. We have depicted a comparison table with few of the existing schemes and our proposed scheme which clearly shows the security advantages of our scheme over those schemes. 
